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Abstract
Risk perception shapes individual behaviour, and is in turn shaped by the consequences of that behaviour.
Here we explore this dynamic in the context of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) spread. We
construct a simplified agent-based model based on a partner selection game, where individuals are paired
with others in the population, and through a decision tree, agree on unprotected sex, protected sex,
or no sex. An individuals choice is conditioned on their HIV status, their perceived population-level
HIV prevalence, and the preferences expressed by the individual with whom they are paired. HIV is
transmitted during unprotected sex with a certain probability. As expected, in model simulations, the
perceived population-level HIV prevalence climbs along with actual HIV prevalence. During this time,
HIV- negative individuals increasingly switch from unprotected sex to protected sex, HIV+ individuals
continue practicing unprotected sex whenever possible, and unprotected sex between HIV+ and HIV-
individuals eventually becomes rare. We also find that the perceived population-level HIV prevalence
diverges according to HIV status: HIV- individuals develop a higher perceived HIV prevalence than HIV+
individuals, although this result is sensitive to how much information is derived from global versus local
sources. This research illustrates a potential mechanism by which distinct groups, as defined by their
sexual behaviour, HIV status, and risk perceptions, can emerge through coevolution of HIV transmission
and risk perception dynamics.
Keywords: game theory, behaviour-prevalence model, HIV transmission model, agent-based model, epi-
demiology
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1 Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) has classified HIV as a pandemic; the infection
continues to spread in most nations, and is particularly prevalent in some of the worlds
poorest nations [1]. Medical treatment has reduced annual rate of AIDS cases dramatically,
however, the rate of new HIV infections has not dropped significantly [2]. Infection occurs by
transfer of blood, semen, vaginal fluid, or breast milk [1], but in many countries the primary
mode of transmission is sexual contact. For example, it is estimated that in the United
States, 80% of new HIV cases are a result of unprotected sex [3]. Much of this infection
is driven by so-called “core groups” that are responsible for a disproportionate amount of
infection, and can drive the epidemic in some populations [4].
How individuals choose sexual partners and how they perceive their risk of infection
within those partnerships appear to be major determinants of sexually risky behaviour as
well as HIV infection risk [5,6]. For example, in men who have sex with men (MSM), a lower
perceived risk of infection within a partnership is correlated with a higher probability of
engaging in unsafe sex [6]. Another study in MSM found that, although most HIV-positive
males practiced safer sex with HIV-negative or HIV-status-unknown partners, having more
lifetime male sexual partners was correlated with being more likely to practice unsafe sex
with such partners [7]. Hence, risk perception, safe sex practices, and sexual partner selection
are determinants of HIV transmission between sex partners [8], and thus HIV prevalence in
the population.
However, HIV prevalence in turn determines risk perception and sexual behaviour. For
example, evidence from African HIV epidemics suggests that individuals adopt safer sex
practices in response to rising HIV prevalence [9]. Individuals also appear to respond to how
severe they expect HIV infection to be, with evidence that both HIV+ and HIV- individuals
engage in more unprotected sex when anti-retroviral therapy (ART) is available; this occurs
because ART causes HIV to be perceived to be more of a chronic disease than a fatal
disease [10]. These findings highlight the feedback loop between risk perception and sexual
partner selection/safe sex practices on the one hand, and HIV prevalence on the other hand:
when HIV prevalence is low, individuals perceive less infection risk and engage in riskier
sexual behaviour, but that in turn can increase HIV prevalence. When HIV prevalence is
high, individuals change their sexual behaviour to protect themselves.
In the field of behavioural epidemiology, models of behavioural influences on HIV trans-
mission were some of the first to be developed. These approaches have analyzed, for example,
the impact of contact patterns between various groups and other population heterogeneities,
and how these factors interact with behavioural effects pertaining either to adherence to in-
terventions or sexual behaviour, where behavioural change is either imposed through changes
in a fixed parameter, or where it responds in a more fluid way to changes in HIV prevalence,
as a model variable or a prevalence-dependent parameter [9, 11–20].
A few of these models have focussed specifically on the topic of sexual partner selection
and how that influences HIV transmission [11, 18]. Game theory provides a very natural
framework for addressing such topics [18], since it allows individual preferences to be concisely
described and provides a way of determining the collective outcomes of these individual-level
strategic decision-making processes [21] (as opposed to modelling the effects of behaviour in
a more phenomenological way, such as a functional form describing how the person-to-person
transmission rate declines with increasing prevalence). However, it also requires assuming
that individuals will maximize their expected utility given the preferences and likely actions
of others. In the context of partner selection and HIV transmission, the ‘game’ is a sexual
interaction between two partners, and the payoff is the utility outcome of a player’s choice
of unprotected or safe sex, given what they believe is the HIV status of their partner [18].
In this paper, we develop an agent-based simulation model that extends a previous game
theoretical model of sexual partner selection and HIV transmission [18]. Individual percep-
tion of HIV infection risk evolves a function of the individual’s past sexual encounters, and
individuals decide on either unprotected sex, protected sex, or no sex with the individuals
with whom they are paired in each time step. Instead of exogenously imposing a pre-existing
population structure where individuals engage in either high-risk or low-risk behaviour, our
objective is to explore how distinct population groups–as defined by differing risk perception,
HIV status, and sexual behaviours–can emerge from the coevolution of individual-level risk
perception and HIV transmission, through partner selection games. We also wish to gain
insight into potential mechanisms for how assortative sexual mixing with respect to level of
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riskiness in sexual behaviour might emerge from this coevolutionary process.
2 Methods
The partner selection model is based on the dynamic signalling game described in Ref. [18],
except modifications are made regarding how individuals perceive their risk of HIV infection
as a function of their encounters, and how this perception is carried into future rounds of
the game. A game represents a strategic interaction between two or more individuals. A
dynamic signalling game is a type of sequential game with two players passing signals back
and forth [18,21,22]. The players may be of differing types. Only the sender knows his/her
own type: the receiver observes the signal but not the type of the sender. The receiver
proceeds to choose an action while updating their beliefs regarding the type of the other
player.
2.1 Partner selection model
The population consists of N individuals forming a highly active core group population
of MSM, such as the patrons of an urban bathhouse. The population is not structured
with respect to age, gender, or other forms of social/cultural heterogeneity. In each round,
individuals are paired at random to play a “Risky Sex Game”. One of the pair is randomly
assigned to be actor 1 (the initiator) and the other is assigned to be actor 2. The strategy
options are Unprotected Sex (US), Protected Sex (PS) and No Sex (NS). Individual status
is either HIV+ or HIV-, hence there are three possible pairs in each round: two HIV-,
two HIV+ and HIV+/HIV-. The interaction describes a potential casual sexual encounter
between two actors who may or may not have had an interaction before. Each actor knows
whether or not they carry HIV, but do not know the HIV status of those they are paired
with. Actors hold their own HIV status as private. Everyone knows the sexual preferences
of HIV+ and HIV- actors, and based on their sexual preferences, an actor will alter their
belief about the HIV status of the individual they are paired with. HIV- actors will not have
unprotected sex with those that they belief are HIV+, while HIV+ actors prefer unprotected
sex regardless of HIV status of partner. Both actors have a belief regarding the HIV status
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of their partner, but they do not know with certainty and do not find out the truth, even if
they eventually have sex (unless they become infected). This game will be embedded in an
agent-based simulation model.
After being paired, the actors choose whether to play the Risky Sex Game with their
partner with probability
ρ(c) =
ω + c
1 + c
(1)
where ρ(c) represents the probability that they will play the game, c represents the cumulative
sex acts that have occurred between actor 1 and actor 2 until this point in time, and the
“gregariousness” parameter ω controls the how the probability of the game being played
depends on how often the actors have engaged in sex previously. Equation (1) partially
captures the effect of learning and reputation. In our baseline analysis, we assume ω = 1,
hence ρ = 1, but we explore ω < 1 in sensitivity analysis. If the actors decide not to play
the game this round, they must wait until the next round of the game to be re-paired.
Should the actors decide to interact further, the game will commence as follows:
1. Actor 1 offers to have either protected sex (PS) or unprotected sex (US).
2. Actor 2 either accepts or makes a counter offer of PS or US.
3. Actor 1 either accepts final offer or ends the interaction with no sex (NS).
The decisions available to each individual in each step of the Risky Sex Game are depicted
in Supplementary Figure 1.
A utility is a value assigned to a possible outcome representing how an individual ranks
their preferences. The utility Ui for actor i of outcome k (k=US, PS, NS) when the HIV
status of actor i is si (si=+, -) and the HIV status of actor j with whom they are paired is
sj (sj=+, -) is given by
Ui(k, si, sj) (2)
where the utilities for various outcomes as they depend on HIV status follow the inequalities
contained in Table 1, which also contains the baseline utility values.
Because actors do not actually know the HIV status of their partner, each actor accrues
an expected utility that depends on how strongly they believe their partner is HIV+. The
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expected utility is a way of weighting utilities with an individuals inherent belief of HIV
prevalence in the population, as represented by the b-value. The expected utility Ei for
actor i in a given round when the outcome is k is therefore given by
Ei(bt, si) = btUi(k, si,+) + (1− bt)Ui(k, si,−) (3)
where bt is the probability with which actor i believes that their partner is HIV+, in the
current round t of the game. With probability bt, actor i believes that their partner is HIV+
and hence actor i would receive utility Ui(k, si,+). Otherwise, actor i would receive utility
Ui(k, si,−). It is assumed that actors will maximize their personal expected utility.
The quantity bt is specific to each actor (agent), and varies over the course of the simulation
as actors update their b values based on their encounters. The value of bt can be updated
during a round, as well as between rounds. At the start of a round, actor 1 offers actor
2 their optimal choice of outcome k based on equation (3), using their current value of bt
based on previous interactions. If actor 1 offers US, then actor 2 increases his/her b-value
according to
bt 7→ α + (1− α)bt (4)
where α is called the “historical influence parameter”, since it measures how much of bt is
from past encounters versus the current offer. If α is high, then actor 2’s assessment of actor
1’s HIV status is strongly dependent on the fact that actor 1 made an offer of unprotected
sex, whereas if α is low, actor 1’s offer had little impact on actor 2’s evaluation of whether or
not actor 1 is HIV+. On the other hand, if actor 1 offers PS, then actor 2 decreases his/her
b-value according to
bt 7→ (1− α)bt (5)
Actor 2 then evaluates their new expected utility from equation (3), using the updated value
of bt, and responds to actor 1 with their own optimal outcome. If the two choices of outcome
are in agreement, the actors will engage in that type of sex (US or PS). However, if they are in
disagreement, Actor 1 will receive Actor 2’s counter-proposal, and Actor 1 will update their
bt value in the same way, using equations (4) and (5) depending on the counter-offer. Actor
1 then uses this updated bt value to determine their new expected utility, again according
to equation (3). If the optimal outcome for Actor 1 has changed and the actors are now in
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agreement, then they engage in that optimal choice of sex. If they remain in disagreement,
then outcome is no sex (NS).
The value of bt is also updated between rounds, based on information the actors are
assumed to be able to receive regarding the actual prevalence of HIV in their population.
This updating follows the equation
bt = βbt−1 + (1− β) It
N
(6)
where It is the prevalence of HIV in the population at the start of round t and β is the
“local information” parameter governing the extent to which an actor’s bt value is based on
information from their interactions versus globally available, accurate information on HIV
prevalence in their population. bt is the value a player carries into round t, based on their bt
value at the end of the previous round t− 1 and how it has been modified through equation
(6) inbetween rounds. For our baseline analysis we assume β = 1 and we explore β < 1 in
sensitivity analysis. In general, we expect β to be close to 1 since the timescale of an HIV
epidemic in a small core group population can be quite rapid [23,24].
At the end of each round, each pair breaks up and individuals are paired randomly again
for the next round. Each player draws their initial b-value b0 randomly from a normal
distribution of mean µ = 0.05 and standard deviation σ = 0.1; sampled values less than 0
or greater than 1 were discarded. We chose a relatively small value for the initial b-value
because recruited individuals in the model are assumed to be younger, and both the perceived
prevalence of HIV in a population as well as the perceived risk of contacting HIV or other
STI’s are less in younger individuals [25–27]. Table 2 describes the different parameters used
in the model and also provides their baseline values.
2.2 Transmission and natural history model
We assume a time scale on the order of a single HIV outbreak in a core group population.
Hence, we neglect recruitment and death, and assume a Susceptible-Infected (SI) natural his-
tory where individuals are initially susceptible, and remain infectious indefinitely once they
are infected. Each round of the game corresponds to a timestep of the simulation model,
and each timestep corresponds to approximately three days. If an outcome of Unprotected
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Sex occurs between an HIV+ and an HIV- actor, then HIV is transmitted with probability
τ = 0.01. For simplicity we assume Protected Sex is perfectly effective in preventing trans-
mission [28]. The population size is N = 1000 players, with 5% of the population being
infected at t = 0.
3 Results
3.1 Baseline scenario
The time series of HIV prevalence (I(t)) initially shows a typical Susceptible-Infected nat-
ural history outbreak pattern, with prevalence increasing exponentially quickly in the early
stages. However, instead of infecting the vast majority of the population, HIV prevalence
subsequently approaches an equilibrium I comprising approximately 60% of the population
(Figure 1a).
The approach to I is asymptotic, and this stabilization occurs because HIV+ and HIV-
actors evolve differing b-values in the course of the outbreak. For the first 50 time steps, the
average b value of HIV+ actors, 〈b+〉, increases rapidly and at roughly the same rate as the
average b value of HIV- actors, 〈b−〉. However, divergence between 〈b+〉 and 〈b−〉 emerges
suddenly after 50 time steps: 〈b−〉 continues to climb with increasing HIV prevalence while
〈b+〉 stabilizes. Before long, 〈b+〉 and 〈b−〉 have diverged considerably (Figure 1a). The
heightened b value of HIV- actors means they often assume those who offer them US are
HIV+ and hence they respond with a counteroffer of PS, avoiding HIV infection. Hence,
HIV- actors are protected from infection by their high b-values, and this slows down the
transmission of HIV, resulting in stabilization of HIV prevalence at approximately 60%. By
time step 1500, the population is divided into two groups: one group is HIV+ and tends to
have a low perception of HIV prevalence in the population, and the other groups is HIV-
and tends to have a higher perception of HIV prevalence in the population.
The divergence of 〈b−〉 and 〈b+〉 occurs primarily because actor b-values are updated only
when a counter-offer is called for. As HIV prevalence increases, an HIV- Actor 2 will increase
his b-value when paired with an HIV+ Actor 1 offering US, but not when paired with an
HIV- Actor 1 offering PS. Hence, as HIV prevalence increases, HIV- actors are increasingly
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being offered US, and they conclude that HIV prevalence is increasing. Similarly, an HIV+
Actor 2 will decrease his b-value when paired with an HIV- Actor 1 offering PS, but not
when paired with an HIV+ Actor 1. Hence, the b-value for HIV+ actors is lower than for
HIV- actors. A modification of the model allowing actors to update their b-values even when
the preferences of the actors are in agreement shows that I(t) and 〈b〉 are similar, but there
is less divergence in 〈b−〉 and 〈b+〉 (Supplementary Figure 2).
The divergence is also driven by a positive feedback loop: actors with slightly higher
b-values in the beginning are somewhat more likely to avoid HIV infection, which in turn
drives their b-value to higher levels according to the mechanism described in the previous
paragraph. Likewise, actors with slightly lower b-values are more likely to become infected,
and their lower b-value will be reinforced by the same mechanism.
A stratification of outcomes by HIV status of actors provides more detail on how these
two groups emerge and interact (Table 3). In the early stages of the outbreak when I(t)
is still small, the most common type of outcome for all three types of pairs is Unprotected
Sex. HIV+/+ pairs always engage in Unprotected Sex, and HIV-/- or HIV+/- pairs engage
in Unprotected Sex significantly more often than Protected Sex or No Sex. However, by the
time that HIV is highly prevalent, the most common outcome is Unprotected Sex in HIV+/+
pairs. Unprotected Sex hardly ever happens in HIV+/- or HIV-/- pairs, where Protected Sex
is instead the most common outcome. In summary, when HIV is highly prevalent, HIV+
actors engage in Unprotected Sex with other HIV+ actors but Protected Sex with HIV-
actors, whereas HIV- actors engage in Protected Sex with both HIV+ and HIV- actors, or
oftentimes No Sex if the other actor is HIV+. Hence, by this stage, the population has
assorted into two distinct groups with very distinct perception and sexual practices.
As expected, HIV prevalence at the pseudo-equilibrium I and the average b-value 〈b〉 are
insensitive to changes in the utility for protected sex, uPS (Figure 2), since changes in the
range 0 < uPS < 100 do not impact the relative utility rankings (Table 1). Increasing the
transmission probability τ increases both the HIV prevalence at the pseudo-equilibrium as
well as 〈b〉 (Figure 2). Changes in the historical influence parameter α also do not have much
impact on I and 〈b〉 unless α = 0, in which case actors’ b-values are fixed and actors never use
information from their interactions to modify their b-value (Figure 2). The differentiation in
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b-values between HIV+ and HIV- individuals is also very robust to changes in uPS, τ , and
α (Figure 3).
3.2 Scenario β < 1
Our baseline assumption is β = 1, meaning that individuals do not have access to a global
source of accurate information on HIV prevalence. When β < 1, individuals base their
b-value partly on global HIV prevalence (Equation (6)). Average HIV prevalence at the
pseudo-equilibrium I and the average b-value 〈b〉 are relatively unaffected by changes in β,
however, the divergence between 〈b−〉 and 〈b+〉 disappears as β decreases, since individuals
increasingly base their perception of HIV prevalence on actual prevalence in the population,
rather than on their interactions with others (Supplementary Figures 3,4). This is robust to
changes in α, uPS and τ (Supplementary Figures 5, 6, Supplementary Table 1). We speculate
that higher values of β close to 1 are most realistic, since low values of β correspond to having
accurate information on global HIV prevalence on a weekly basis, which is not realistic for
most populations. We also note that the rise in 〈b〉, 〈b−〉, and 〈b+〉 is more gradual than
the baseline scenario, indicating that Unprotected Sex will be preferred by both types for a
longer amount of time.
3.3 Scenario ω < 1
Our baseline assumption is ω = 1, meaning that actors play the Risky Sex Game regardless
of the previous sexual history of those they are paired with (Equation (1)). The divergence
between 〈b−〉 and 〈b+〉 persists when ω < 1, and I and 〈b〉 are likewise relatively unaffected
(Supplementary Figures 7-9). The population still evolves into two groups characterized
by divergent HIV status and sexual behaviour (Supplementary Table 2). The main impact
of decreasing ω is to cause system evolution to slow down on account of a larger number
of rejected pairings due to lack of a previous history between actors. However, long-term
dynamics are unchanged. We expect larger values of c to apply in populations that are
smaller, where individuals are more likely to be known to one another.
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3.4 Sensitivity analysis
We analyzed a variant of the model where individuals do not immediately know whether
they have been infected, and only discover it if they are tested. Testing occurs with prob-
ability t per timestep and we assume 100% accuracy. HIV+ individuals only change their
utility from HIV- to HIV+ once they become aware of their changed HIV status. When the
testing probability t is sufficiently high, then the predictions of this variant model agree with
those of the baseline model (Supplementary Figures 4, 5). As t decreases, some differences
begin to emerge: total HIV prevalence is higher when the testing probability is very low
(Supplementary Figure 4). This occurs because there are more individuals in the population
who are HIV+ and yet make decisions according to HIV- utilities, unwittingly spreading
infection in cases where the outcome of the interaction is unprotected sex with an HIV- indi-
vidual. Also, as t decreases, the separation in b-values between HIV+ and HIV- individuals
persists even as t approaches zero (Supplementary Figure 5). However, when t is high, the
b-value of HIV+ individuals who are not aware of their status aligns with the b-value of
HIV+ individuals who are aware of their status, whereas when t is low, the b-value of HIV+
individuals who are not aware of their status aligns with the b-value of HIV- individuals
(Supplementary Figure 5).
We assumed a population size of 1,000 because the number of clientele of a typical urban
bathhouse is on this order of magnitude [29,30]. However, we also experimented with varying
N from 500 to 10,000, finding that model predictions are close to our baseline population of
N = 1, 000 (the N = 5, 000 case is shown in Supplementary Figure 6).
We also conducted a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, where distributions are defined
around certain input parameters based on lowest and highest plausible values, repeated
model simulations are conducted after sampling each input parameter from the distribution
independently for each simulation, and mean and standard deviation of the resulting outputs
are reported. This was conducted on Iinitial, τ , α, and b0. Results can be seen in tables 4
and 5, and indicate a continued separation between average b-values for HIV+ and HIV -
individuals. These data demonstrates the robustness of the model with respect to uncertainty
in those four parameters.
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4 Discussion
Here we have explored a potential mechanism for how distinct groups–as defined by risk
perception, HIV status, and sexual behaviour–can emerge out of the coevolution of HIV
transmission and risk perception through sexual partner dynamics. The changing patterns
of risk perception and sexual behaviour are plausible: the perceived level of HIV prevalence
in the population rises along with the actual HIV prevalence, and as HIV spreads, more
HIV- individuals opt for protected sex.
We observed that the actors’ b-values (the perceived probability that a randomly chosen
individual in the population is HIV positive) diverged according to HIV status, with HIV-
actors developing higher b-values and HIV+ actors developing lower b-values. This diver-
gence was robust to changes in all model parameters except for β, which controlled the extent
to which information on HIV prevalence is taken from global sources versus being based on
their interactions with others. However, divergence was found to be less pronounced if actors
were allowed to update their b-values not only when a counter-offer is discordant but also
when the other actor agrees to what has been offered.
In at least one population, patterns of risk perception and sexual behaviour similar to
those predicted by our model have been found. In a study of MSM in the United States, it
was found that study participants with unrecognized HIV infection perceived themselves to
have a low lifetime risk for acquiring HIV (i.e., they had low b-values), and also engaged in
riskier sex [26]. This is consistent with our model prediction that HIV+ individuals have a
lower perceived risk of being infected than HIV- individuals.
Because our objective was to identify a potential mechanism for how coevolution of risk
perception and HIV transmission could lead to the emergence of groups, and because our
focus was on a small, relatively homogeneous core group population over a relatively short
timescale, we did not include important heterogeneities in transmission, population struc-
ture, or risk perception, although some of these could influence our results quantitatively
or qualitatively. For example, we neglected age structure, gender structure, vital dynamics
(birth and death) and the details of HIV natural history in infected hosts. Future work
could explore whole-population models and also build greater realism into the decision-
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making process. Our assumption that each actor knows whether or not they carry HIV is an
idealization; in fact, there may be a significant lag between contracting HIV and becoming
aware of HIV status, even in industrialized countries [31]. However, we explored the impact
of this assumption in sensitivity analysis.
The model predicted that, at the pseudo-equilibrium, unprotected sex will usually be
practiced in HIV+/HIV+ pairs, and protected sex in HIV+/HIV- or HIV-/HIV- pairs. This
mixing pattern is the outcome of our assumed mechanisms of interaction between risk per-
ception, partner selection, and infection transmission. Similar patterns of assortative mixing
are observed in real populations. We do not claim that such assortative mixing patterns are
sufficiently explained by this mechanism, however, we hypothesize that this mechanism can
contribute to these mixing patterns.
HIV prevalence is not the only determinant of an individual’s perception of HIV infection
risks, and many studies consider correlates for perceived risk such as gender, socioeconomic
status and age, which are also influential. These previous studies are generally cross-sectional
in nature, whereas longitudinal studies would be better suited to quantify factors of a dy-
namic nature such as feedback from evolving HIV prevalence during an outbreak. We suggest
efforts should be made to conduct longitudinal population surveys to better gauge how risk
perception and sexual partner practices evolve in response to changes in HIV prevalence and
through the partner selection process, since our model indicates that it plays a central role
in whether the b-values of HIV+ and HIV- individuals diverge or not.
Previous modelling approaches have not always considered how risk perception and trans-
mission dynamics coevolve in the case of HIV. Our model highlights how individual percep-
tion of personal HIV infection risk can coevolve with HIV population prevalence in the course
of an epidemic. This implies that risk perception is not a fixed, unchanging quantity that
can be adequately described out of the context of HIV prevalence in the study population.
Rather, risk perception influences HIV prevalence, and HIV prevalence in turn influences
risk perception, so that they form a single, coupled system. It is difficult for cross-sectional
studies to capture this effect, which plays out over time. However, future longitudinal stud-
ies could test this by attempting to correlate perceived HIV infection risk with actual HIV
prevalence at different time points in an HIV epidemic, as well as monitor how perception
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of personal risks and local or global HIV prevalence changes before and after infection with
HIV. This will become increasingly important as HIV vaccines become a reality over the
next decade, since HIV vaccines might change how HIV infection risk and/or severity are
perceived, and thus might change behaviour as well. We suggest that more attention needs
to be given to this potential interaction, and more generally to the issue of the dynamics of
core group formation and maintenance in the context of sexually-transmitted infections.
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Figure 1: (a) HIV prevalence over time (〈I〉, black). (b) Average b-values over time by type, HIV- (black
dashed 〈b−〉), HIV+ (grey dashed〈b+〉). This illustrates the coevolution between the HIV prevalence in
the population, and the assessment of risk among its individuals. We also note the divergence of b-values
amongst the HIV- and HIV+ groups, demonstrating a significant difference in risk assessment.
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Figure 2: HIV prevalence ( % infected, 〈I〉, black), and total average b (〈b〉, grey) for: (a) alpha, (b)
transmission, (c) PS Utility. This demonstrates the robustness of the parameters used within the model. As
expected, HIV prevalence rates are closely tied to average b-values amongst the population.
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Figure 3: Average b-value for HIV- (〈b−〉, dashed black) and HIV+ (〈b+〉, dashed grey) individuals for: (a)
alpha, (b) transmission, (c) PS Utility. This also shows the robustness of the parameters by indicating the
cluster separation remains for varying parameter values.
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si sj xUS xPS xNS
actor i status actor j status utility for US utility for PS utility for NS preferences of actor i
HIV+ HIV+ 100 50 0 US > PS > NS
HIV+ HIV- 100 50 0 US > PS > NS
HIV- HIV+ -50 50 0 PS > NS > US
HIV- HIV- 100 50 0 US > PS > NS
Table 1: Utilities for actor i, given status of actors i and j, and type of sex.
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Term Definition Baseline value
b0 Initial b-value: Initial probability value individually chosen from
a beta distribution of mean 0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.1
0.05
α Historical influence parameter: Measures how much of the b-value
will be based on past experience
0.015
τ Transmission probability: Probability of HIV spread from an
HIV+ player to an HIV- player through US
0.01 [28]
uPS Protected Sex utility 50
β Local information parameter: Proportion of the b-value that is
a combination of an individual’s interpretation of risk, and an
accurate value of the actual proportion of infected individuals in
the population
1
ω Gregariousness parameter: Degree of willingness to interact with
strangers
1
N Population size 1000
Iinitial Initial number of infected players at the beginning 5%
I Number of infected individuals in the population 5%
Table 2: Parameter definitions, and parameter values for baseline scenario.
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Time +/+ +/- -/-
100 US 0.42 10.32 58.51
Prev 8.2% PS 0 2.34 10.71
NS 0 0.002 17.67
200 US 0.92 11.64 24.71
Prev 11.7% PS 0 6.14 33.53
NS 0 0.05 22.98
300 US 2.15 14.68 18.08
Prev 16.9% PS 0 9.77 35.84
NS 0 0.15 19.30
400 US 3.64 17.61 13.53
Prev 22.6% PS 0 13.25 35.7
NS 0 0.50 15.74
500 US 7.21 20.57 8.69
Prev 31.5% PS 0 17.12 33.37
NS 0 1.01 11.99
1500 US 34.96 1.44 0
Prev 59.5% PS 0 25.64 16.52
NS 0 21.34 0.07
Table 3: Cumulative sex acts for type. First three rows show total number of sex acts between t = 0 and
t = 100, second three rows show total number of sex acts between t = 100 and t = 200, etc. t = 1500
represents cumulative sex acts between t = 1400 and t = 1500 at equilibria. This table shows evidence of
how the preferred type of sex changes over time. As HIV prevalence and average b-value increases, we see a
reduction in Unprotected Sex among HIV- couples as expected.
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Parameter Distribution Mean, SD
α Normal distribution 0.015, 0.0025
τ Normal distribution 0.01, 0.0025
Iinitial Normal distribution 0.05, 0.015
b0 Normal distribution 0.05, 0.015
Table 4: Parameters adjusted in sensitivity analysis. Values recorded from normal distribution, with proba-
bilities less than 0 or greater than 1 discarded.
Average 2SD
HIV Prevalence % 0.5897 0.1081
Average b-value 0.5489 0.0439
HIV - average b-value 0.7403 0.0882
HIV + average b-value 0.4171 0.0609
Average separation in b-value 0.3232 0.0343
Table 5: Parameters adjusted in sensitivity analysis. Results continue to demonstrate significant divergence
between average b-values between HIV + and HIV population.
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